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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to critically reflect upon some of the practical difficulties which 
surround the implementation of an outcome-focused payment initiative, colloquially referred to as 
Payment by Results (PbR), in a drug and alcohol service situated in the North of England. Drawing 
upon the findings of a longitudinal study in a residential rehabilitation service, the discussion 
illustrates some of the tensions and dilemmas which surround the introduction of increasingly 
business-orientated decisions within a person-centered environment that is designed to work 
alongside some of societies most troubled and troublesome individuals. To conclude, the article 
suggests that financially-driven processes (such as PbR) commodify the rehabilitative ideal, 
making service users and practitioners alike increasingly accountable to a counterintuitive fiscal 
endeavor.  
 
Introduction  
The central document which outlines the vision behind the Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) 
agenda is the Ministry of Justice paper Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform 
(Ministry of Justice, 2013). The fundamental aim of TR is to extend rehabilitation to more 
(ex)offenders by changing the design, delivery and commissioning of services that work alongside 
those who are involved in the Criminal Justice System in England and Wales (Ministry of Justice, 
2013:06). To achieve the aims and objectives of the strategy new payment initiatives, colloquially 
referred to as Payment by Results (PbR), have been introduced in and around the Criminal Justice 
System in an attempt to provide a degree of flexibility to do ‘what works,’ promote freedom from 
bureaucracy and encourage services to focus ‘relentlessly’ on reforming (ex)offenders (ibid). 
Although PbR is a relatively untested concept in the field of criminal justice (Hedderman, 2013:43) 
the Government claim that it will contribute to the implementation of effective ways of 
rehabilitating (ex)offenders and reward providers that deliver the most effective rehabilitation 
programmes (Home Office, 2015).  
 
Whilst PbR is a relatively new addition to the criminal justice arena, it is not a new concept. It was 
introduced to the United Kingdom in 2000 by the Labour Government’s National Health Service 
(NHS) plan, which set out to link the allocation of funds to the activities that hospitals undertook. 
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This marked a clear departure from previous funding arrangements whereby hospitals were paid 
according to block contracts, which involve a fixed payment for a broadly specified service (Battye 
and Sunderland, 2011). Generally speaking, PbR is designed to pay providers on the basis of the 
outcomes that they achieve rather than the activities undertaken. The fundamental aim of PbR, in 
theory, is to improve service quality by offering bonuses to service providers for performance 
improvement or withholding payments for poor performance, improve transparency around 
spending by putting a tariff on service user needs and ease pressure on public spending budgets by 
staggering payments over longer periods of time (National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 
2013).  
 
The idea that the Government should pay services according to the outcomes that they achieve 
rather than the activities that are undertaken has obvious attractions, particularly in the current 
economic climate (Hedderman, 2013). However, as the findings that are presented here suggest, 
the implementation of such a financially-motivated policy directive contributes little more than 
additional pressures and strains at the coal face of service delivery. Not only ‘transforming 
rehabilitation’ but commodifying the rehabilitative ideal (more so than ever before) as service 
users and practitioners become increasingly accountable for the shortcomings of a misguided, 
counterproductive payment system.  
 
Implementing Reform  
The 2010 Drug Strategy Reducing demand, Restricting supply, Building recovery: Supporting 
people to live a drug free life outlined the Coalition Government’s approach to tackling substance 
use in the United Kingdom (Her Majesty’s Government, 2010). The Strategy called for more 
responsibility to be put on the individual, placed more power and accountability into the hands of 
local communities and advocated a whole person approach to substance use in which an 
individual’s level of recovery capital is recognised as one of the best predictors of sustained 
recovery. To achieve the aims and objectives of the Strategy, the Government outlined plans to 
introduce PbR to the sector in an attempt to reform the way in which programmes that cater for 
substance users were paid for their services.  
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In April 2011, after a bidding process which involved several Drug and Alcohol Action Teams 
(DAATs) across England, the Department of Health announced that eight areas had been selected 
to pilot PbR over a two-year period: Bracknell Forest, Enfield, Kent, Lincolnshire, Oxfordshire, 
Stockport, Wakefield and Wigan. The PbR pilot scheme aimed to aggregate existing funding 
streams, align overlapping services to increase available funds for providers and test the 
assumption that commissioning service providers on an outcome-focused basis would lead to 
improved efficiency as well as a transparent funding system based on the achievement of high 
level, long-term and interim outcomes (Department of Health, 2012).  
 
In an attempt to create a degree of consistency across the eight pilot areas a co-design group, which 
consisted of representatives from local partnerships in the pilot areas, central government 
departments such as the Department of Health, the Home Office, Ministry of Justice, Department 
for Work and Pensions and the National Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse (NTA, now part 
of Public Health England), as well as experts from the field, established a set of high-level outcome 
measures that spread across four domains. The four domains were: free from drug(s) of 
dependence, employment, offending, and health and well-being. The domain which covered 
employment was later removed before the PbR pilot scheme went live in April 2012 (Department 
of Health, 2012). Although a generic PbR model was designed, each pilot area went on to adapt 
and modify the proposed model, which allowed for considerable local discretion. Such variability 
has since contributed to a limited central repository of knowledge and absence of a robust evidence 
base to refer to, which has subsequently limited the credibility of the payment mechanism on a 
local as well as national scale (National Audit Office, 2015).  
 
Despite a clear inability to arrive at a general consensus about the design, delivery and efficacy of 
PbR in and around the alcohol and drug treatment field, the agenda continues to progress at a 
steady pace, particularly in the criminal justice arena. Even though we are yet to develop a robust 
evidence base which supports outcome-based commissioning (in the aforementioned sectors) we 
have witnessed the marketization of PbR as a vehicle that will steer ongoing strategies for reform 
(Her Majesty’s Government, 2010; Ministry of Justice, 2013). The following discussion will now 
draw upon some of the tensions and dilemmas which surround the introduction of PbR into the 
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day-to-day delivery of alcohol and drug treatment in a residential rehabilitation service, operating 
as a Therapeutic Community (TC), to illustrate this point in further detail.  
 
TCs are structured, psychologically informed environments characteried by a community-as-
method treatment approach which directs an individual’s attention towards their thoughts, feelings 
and relationships with significant others (Ravndal, 2003). They are places where social 
relationships, day-to-day occurrences and therapeutic activities are all deliberately designed to 
help improve health and well-being (The Consortium of Therapeutic Communities, 2015). TCs 
provide holistic, person-centred interventions which offer intense support for some of the most 
complex and vulnerable members of society who usually have a history of involvement with the 
care system and/or Criminal Justice System. They have an alternative conception of individuals 
who are deemed to be ‘problematic’ which is much more positive than current dominant beliefs 
about substance users.  
 
Generally speaking, a TC consists of three programme stages; welcome house, primary and senior. 
In a six month programme, the welcome house stage lasts a minimum of four weeks and maximum 
of eight weeks and is designed to provide a warm welcome to new arrivals. The primary stage lasts 
a minimum of twelve weeks and maximum of twenty-two weeks. During the primary stage 
residents are expected to comply with the rules of the programme, demonstrate a practical 
knowledge of TCs, display limited personal disclosures in group sessions and reveal a degree of 
self-awareness and motivation. The senior stage lasts a minimum of ten weeks and maximum of 
eighteen weeks. At the senior stage residents are expected to take on a greater level of 
responsibility and use the skills that they have learnt and developed during their time in the 
programme to plan for their re-entry into the wider community. 
 
The ethos which underpins all of the daily activities that take place in a TC is based on promoting 
human dignity, respect for all members of society and human liberation, rather than moral 
condemnation (Scott and Gosling, 2015). Programme participants are recognized as a person, as 
an individual, not a problem, number, risk or financial commodity (Gosling, 2015). Instead of 
governing from a distance, TCs provoke questions of the self, but in so doing, also provide an 
‘invitation to change’ (Gosling, 2015) which involves a safe and supportive environment in which 
5 
 
longitudinal support, friendship and recognition of one and others’ struggles and needs are 
embraced in the journey away from substance use and related harms.  
 
Between August 2010 and March 2013 the author conducted a longitudinal study in a residential 
TC in the North of England. The service provides a six-month, stage-based programme which can 
cater for men and women over the age of 18 who have a history of substance use. During fieldwork 
a voluntary PbR scheme, which took place over a 6-month period, was piloted in an attempt to 
prepare the organisation for the anticipated changes to the commissioning environment (see 
Gosling, 2015 for further details). The PbR scheme was available to all local authorities who made 
referrals to the service. Rather than paying a flat-rate weekly fee, the PbR model required local 
authorities to pay a weekly product fee and a results payment. The product fee was the amount that 
the service charged for each of the three programme stages and the results payment was the fee 
charged to local authorities when a client had achieved a specified outcome by an agreed date. In 
this instance, the service would receive a results payment if a client ‘progressed’ to the next 
treatment stage before a contractually agreed date (negotiated before a client entered treatment and 
without their consent) was reached. If a client had not progressed to the next stage of treatment, 
by the specified date, the service would not receive the results payment. This meant that before a 
client had even entered the TC, their progression through the programme was already decided and 
directed by contractual obligations and financial motivations as opposed to individual need and 
personal development.  
 
All clients, regardless of how they were funded by their local authority, were set a number of 
individualised targets that they were expected to achieve during each programme stage. The targets 
attached to each of the phases were similar for both flat-rate and PbR residents as they were directly 
influenced by a client’s Outcomes Star1. The only difference was the stringent deadlines within 
which the targets had to be reached. The introduction of a high-level policy directive, characterised 
by fixed deadlines and absolute measures within a setting based on humanistic principles and 
                                                          
1 The Outcomes Star explores aspects of an individual’s life such as physical, emotional and mental health, substance 
use, offending behaviour, money management and so on. It can be used by professionals to help establish short and 
long term goals with clients, address areas of need, and identify personal growth over a given period of time 
6 
 
incremental processes created an array of adverse consequences due to the contrasting 
philosophies of PbR and the TC.  
 
We could fall down massively here because it could take away the integrity of the 
programme. Residents may be kept regardless of their progress and commitment to change 
because we need them for the money and this will have an impact on other people and how 
they see it here. 
(Staff, August 2011) 
 
It makes me angry when they blatantly do things for money. You feel that you have a price 
tag on your head sometimes and that is just as bad, if not worse, than the other labels that 
I am trying to get away from. 
(Resident. May, 2012) 
 
The introduction of PbR, albeit for a brief moment in time, brought with it questions about the 
integrity of the programme as well as the extent to which clients were defined and treated as 
individuals or financial assets. Staff members, believed that PbR would dilute the therapeutic 
integrity of the programme if it were to become a permanent commissioning tool and clients felt 
that the initiative forced them to become part of a process whereby services are able to profit from 
people’s misfortune and vulnerability. In addition to the oppressive practices that PbR introduced 
to the setting under study, it became clear how such financially-driven processes hold the ability 
to undermine rather than facilitate genuine individual progression.  
 
Showing that someone has progressed on paper isn’t hard when you really think about it, 
so that bit of PbR won’t be the problem, it’s the deadlines. It’s going to be so hard, 
especially in here, because you just never know what’s around the corner. 
 (Staff. July, 2011) 
 
Retention was the over-arching aim of PbR in this case. If the service retained clients who were 
funded via PbR, then they would receive all of the product fee and results payments. Although 
retention is a legitimate concern, it is not necessarily a conclusive or definitive indicator of a 
successful outcome in a TC (or indeed any recovery-orientated service) due to the array of 
methodological and conceptual issues which surround its definition and measurement (Gosling, 
2015). More broadly, the very notion of retention as an indicator of success fails to recognise that 
an unplanned discharge from a TC does not necessarily mean that an individual’s participation 
was a failure or indeed ineffective (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2004; National Treatment 
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Agency for Substance Misuse, 2009; National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2009). For those who live 
and work in TCs, the definition and representation of a successful outcome is complex, given the 
multi-faceted, personal nature of the recovery process. 
 
You’ve got to remember that being a junkie isn’t just about drugs, it’s about your whole 
way of life; how you  behave, how you think, how you feel, what makes you tick. Recovery 
isn’t just about doing a programme to get off drugs. That’s the easy bit; you will detox just 
lying on your bed. It’s everything else that surrounds the drugs that’s hard coz you’ve 
actually got to work on them. Being here gives you the space to start doing that. 
 (Resident. August, 2011) 
 
 
It’s about each individual and their journey through the programme, not ticking a box. I do 
this job because I want to see people change their lives. 
(Staff. April, 2012) 
 
The above quotations provide a stark contrast to the fixed deadlines and bureaucratic processes 
which underpin PbR. A process clearly driven and focused on establishing how much a dictated 
‘successful outcome’ should cost commissioners, rather than understanding and appreciating the 
value of socially-just responses to substance use which not only recognise, but appreciate, that 
recovery is a life-long process not a stand-alone end of story event which consists of a definitive 
‘end product’.  
 
All this is about is money and making sure that heads are on beds. 
(Resident. August, 2011)  
 
Employing programme completion, as opposed to individual progression, as a successful outcome 
measure provides an early indication that this seemingly new and innovative payment initiative is 
not only detached from the realities of the work that takes place on the ground, but, able to 
transform some of the most complex and vulnerable people in society into a commodity that can 
be bought and sold within an increasingly competitive market.  
 
At the end of the day everything comes down to money. I know this place has got to make 
a profit, but we’re people and chaotic people at that. Half of us don’t even know what 
you’re on about when you’re talking about paying by results or whatever it is.  
(Resident. August, 2011) 
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This illustrates how incentives such as PbR dehumanize the TC experience as an individual is 
removed from the epicenter of their programme and replaced by a series of bureaucratic processes 
that bear no positive effect whatsoever upon their journey to recovery (Gosling, 2015). Thus 
undermining rather than facilitating genuine individual progression. Findings also suggest that 
PbR introduced an air of uncertainty amongst staff members. This was because they felt that the 
contractual obligations and business-orientated nature of the initiative would add an oppressive, 
financial dimension to their workload and day-to-day duties if the scheme were to become a 
permanent feature of the drug and alcohol treatment landscape.  
 
Not only do I have to think about my client’s needs but now I have to think about the 
financial implications of what I do. If I fail to have paperwork completed and sent by a 
certain date then we lose out. What happens if I’m off sick or on annual leave? Is it my 
fault if a report is due in but I wasn’t here to do it and we end up losing money?  
(Staff member. July, 2011) 
 
This point re-iterates a number of concerns that have been raised by service providers (involved in 
the national PbR recovery pilot project) who have questioned the implementation of PbR in the 
alcohol and drug treatment field given the general lack of knowledge which surrounds the 
incentive as well as its ability to provide ‘value for money’ (National Audit Office, 2015:08). The 
aforementioned points illustrate how the short-sighted nature of PbR has generated a new set of 
questions and concerns for those working within already demanding environments alongside 
difficult to reach populations.  
 
Conclusion  
The discussion presented here illustrates (albeit briefly) some of the tensions and dilemmas which 
surround the introduction of increasingly business-orientated decisions within an environment that 
is designed to work alongside some of society’s most complex and vulnerable people. It has been 
suggested that PbR is detached from the realities of the work that takes place at the coal face of 
service delivery in one situated TC. This is due to the fact that it is fundamentally based upon dated 
concepts and ideological representations of a successful treatment outcome. Rather than 
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encouraging innovation and promoting reform, vulnerable people and under-resourced staff are 
not only lost but totally overlooked as financial gain is prioritized over individual need.  
 
Fox and Albertson (2012) suggest that PbR has a place in the commissioning of services, but its 
role in the Criminal Justice System is likely to be limited. The findings presented throughout this 
article build upon this point and suggest that although the role of PbR may be limited, the impact 
of such a counterproductive initiative, if adopted as a standardised mode of commissioning 
services within and around the Criminal Justice System, is potentially monumental. Hunter and 
Breidenbach-Roe (2013, citied in Webster 2015) suggest that in certain cases, PbR has been used 
purely as an alternative way of paying for the same service, rather than a method of improving 
outcomes by developing new forms of service provision. In this instance, PbR was utilized as an 
alternative way of paying for a service. Rather than improving outcomes, the initiative created a 
series of unintended consequences due to the introduction of a misguided ‘outcome’ measure 
within an environment that works with some of the most complex and vulnerable people in society. 
Indeed, PbR has the ability and momentum to help create new forms of service provision, but the 
likelihood that such services will be in a position to provide genuine care, compassion and support 
to those attempting to take a different path in life (whatever that may be) is highly unlikely given 
the prioritization of financial gain and commodification of some of the most hard to reach people 
in society.  
 
With this in mind, it is absolutely vital that politicians, practitioners, academics and service users 
come together to develop a clear, informed rationale that can explain why PbR is the right 
commissioning model for the Transforming Rehabilitation agenda (and indeed any other strategies 
for reform), how it will operate in practice, taking into consideration the experience of PbR 
schemes thus far, and consider alternative ways to support an outcome-focused approach that is 
fundamentally driven by a grounded understanding of practice, rather than a politically motivated, 
financially driven agenda.  
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